Appendix 1: The list of CPPCC formal organized groups

1. Communist Party
2. Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang
3. China Democratic League
4. China Democratic National Construction Association
5. China Association for Promoting Democracy
6. Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party
7. China Zhi Gong Party
8. Jiu San Society
9. Taiwan Democratic Self-government League
10. Personages without party affiliation
11. Communist Youth League of China
12. All-China Federation of Trade Unions
13. All-China Women’s Federation
14. All-China Youth Federation
15. All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce
16. China Association for Science and Technology
17. All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots
18. All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
19. Literature and art Circles
20. Science and technology Circles
21. Social sciences Circles
22. Economic Circles
23. Agriculture Circles
24. Education Circles
25. Sports Circles
26. Press and publication Circles
27. Medicine and health Circles
28. Group for Friendship with Foreign Countries
29. Group for Welfare and Social Security
30. Ethnic minorities
31. Religious bodies
32. Specially invited figures from Hong Kong
33. Specially invited figures from Macao
34. Other specially invited figures
Appendix 2: Additional Results

Although the descriptive statistics in Table 1 is informative, we estimated a probit model to identify the correlation between the characteristics of the delegate and participation in policy coalitions in the NPC and CPPCC. Table A1 reports the estimation results.\(^1\) First, we find little evidence that employment ties to central government agencies or to the education sector positively correlate with participation in policy coalitions in the NPC (Columns 1–4), this is in part because a high percentage of the bills was sponsored by those who have employment ties with the MOE. We find evidence, however, that employment ties to the central government agencies positively correlate with participation in the national policy coalition in the CPPCC (Columns 5–6). More importantly, those CPPCC delegates whose employment were directly controlled by the MOE (\(Central\ Work\ Unit \times Education\ Sector\ Tie = 1\)) are more likely to join the coalition that demands the central government’s financial commitment (Columns 7–8). These results suggest that CPPCC is more subject to bureaucratic influence than the NPC.

Notably, the estimate of employment ties to central government agencies is negative and statistically significant in the model when we include the interaction term (Column 8). Our interpretation is that delegates working for the local government are more eager to Demand Central Government Financial Resource because fiscal transfers from the central government are windfall revenues to their local governments, while other delegates from other central government agencies may not always support allocating more funding to the MOE instead of their own government agencies.

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\(^1\)Table A1 in the online appendix reports our robustness checks after including provincial dummies. Estimates of our main independent variables and employment ties to central government agencies and the education sector as well as their interaction terms are quantitatively consistent with those reported in Table 2.
Table A1: Determinants of Policy Coalition Participation (1983-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NPC Bills</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>CPPCC Proposals</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrow Coalition Definition</td>
<td>Broad Coalition Definition</td>
<td>Coalition of National Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Work Unit</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>0.805***</td>
<td>0.562***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Sector Tie</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Work Unit x Education Sector</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.623***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.783)</td>
<td>(0.590)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
<td>0.355***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Experience in National Assemblies</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Party Member</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.891*</td>
<td>0.907*</td>
<td>0.192*</td>
<td>0.213**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CCP Party Member</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>1.254**</td>
<td>1.265**</td>
<td>0.770***</td>
<td>0.783***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The estimation results are based on probit models. Dependent variable is coded 1 if a NPC bill or CPPCC proposal is part of the coalition defined above. Clustered standard errors for a given year are reported in the parentheses. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another interesting result emerging from this analysis is that parties serve as one of the main venues for coalition building. Both CCP party members as well as non-CCP party members are more likely to participate in the coalitions than nonparty members. In particular, non-CCP party members are more active in the CPPCC, which is subject to less control by the CCP. This finding is consistent with our qualitative studies showing that the party affiliation is an important channel for coalition building among NPC and CPPCC delegates.

Although China is a one-party regime, there are eight major non-CCP parties in China. These parties are 1) Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; 2) China Democratic League; 3) China Democratic National Construction Association; 4) China Association for Promoting Democracy; 5) Peasants and Workers Democratic Party; 6) China Zhi Gong Party; 7) Jiu San Society; 8) Taiwan Democratic Self-government League. Although many members of these non-CCP party members hold government positions, they do not impose any challenge to the domination of the CCP in Chinese politics.
Finally, some could argue that delegates in China’s national assemblies increasingly seek to represent local interests, and our model has not considered the correlation between local preferences and the patterns of NPC bills and CPPCC submission. Unfortunately, China does not have comprehensive public opinion data to evaluate constituency influence in the legislature. Nonetheless, we adopted the approach in Truex (2016) by taking advantage of the 2004 “Chinese Attitudes toward Inequality and Distributive Injustice.”

We used the only variable in the survey measuring citizens’ demand for greater government spending in education and calculated the average response for each province. We then explore the correlation between provincial measure of demand for education spending and the numbers of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals in each province. Our analysis shows little positive correlation between citizens’ demand and delegate behavior in each province, whether before, during, or after the 2004 survey in both the NPC and CPPCC. Figures B1 and B2 below shows that the fitted regression lines of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals are negative in most years, and the estimates are not statistically significant.

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3 See Whyte (2010) for more details about the first wave of the survey conducted in 2004.
4 Note that these numbers are only approximates and may not be representative for the province because the sampling strategy in the 2004 survey aimed to achieve representation for the national sample instead of the provincial sample. However, Truex (2016) used the 2008 China Survey to demonstrate the correlation between consistency influence and legislative behavior, and the 2008 China Survey faces the same sampling problem as the 2004 survey used in this analysis.
Figure B1: Evaluating Constituency Influence in the NPC
Figure B2: Evaluating Constituency Influence in the CPPCC
Appendix 3: Additional Network Graphs
Figure C1: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1983
Figure C2: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1984
Figure C3: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1985

- Central & Edu
- Central & Non-Edu
- Local & Edu
- Local & Non-Edu
- Prov Link
- Non-CCP Party Link
- CCP Party Link
- Party & Prov Link

Coalition of National Policy
Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource
Figure C4: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1986
Figure C5: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1987
Figure C6: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1988
Figure C7: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1989
Figure C8: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1990
Figure C9: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1991

[Diagram of CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1991 with annotations]

Legend:
- ■ Central & Edu
- ● Central & Non-Edu
- □ Local & Edu
- ○ Local & Non-Edu
- — Prov Link
- —— Non-CCP Party Link
- ——— CCP Party Link
- —— Party & Prov Link

Coalition of National Policy
Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource
Figure C10: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1992
Figure C11: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1993

- Central & Edu
- Central & Non-Edu
- Local & Edu
- Local & Non-Edu
- Provenance Link
- Non-CCP Party Link
- CCP Party Link
- Party & Provenance Link
Figure C12: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1994
Figure C13: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1995
Figure C17: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1999

Legend:
- Central & Edu
- Central & Non-Edu
- Local & Edu
- Local & Non-Edu
- Prov Link
- Non-CCP Party Link
- CCP Party Link
- Party & Prov Link
Figure C18: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2000

Coalition of National Policy
Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource
Figure C19: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2001

Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource
Figure C20: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2002
Figure C21: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2003
Figure C22: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2004
Figure C23: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2005

- Central & Edu
- Central & Non-Edu
- Local & Edu
- Local & Non-Edu
- Prov Link
- Non-CCP Party Link
- CCP Party Link
- Party & Prov Link
Figure C24: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2006
Figure C25: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2007